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ABSTRACT 
In many parts of the country, hydraulic fracturing has brought energy 
development onto people’s doorsteps. Efforts by local governments to 
employ traditional land use mechanisms to study and mitigate some of 
the impacts of these latest intrusions have erupted into battles over the 
scope of statewide agencies’ control. 
Forgotten in this fray are many renewable energy resources. As a 
general rule, they are not subject to statewide oversight, and 
consequently renewable energy providers must navigate the myriad of 
siting and permitting requirements of local jurisdictions. For several 
years, scholars have urged more statewide renewable energy siting 
procedures to level the playing field. California is the national leader in 
renewable energy deployment, yet its statewide energy commission does 
not have jurisdiction over the siting of photovoltaic solar or wind energy 
plants. This article explores when statewide siting is beneficial and when 
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it may be contraindicated, making a case for consolidation of all large-
scale siting under the purview of California’s “superagency,” the 
California Energy Commission. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The struggle to determine the most appropriate level of regulation is age-old: 
should federal law preempt the laws of the states and should state law preempt 
local control? Local authority prevails for those who believe that democratic 
governments “deriv[e] their just powers from the consent of the governed,”1 that 
“the government closest to the people serves the people best.”2 
Hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, has reawakened this tension between state 
and local control in several states.3 As just one example, in the fall of 2014, 
Coloradoans faced the prospect of up to a dozen ballot initiatives addressing the 
power of local governments to restrict fracking operations within their 
jurisdictions.4 Although Colorado’s governor convinced proponents to 
temporarily withdraw their initiative campaigns by creating a task force to 
consider solutions, 5 now that the task force has made its recommendations, 
dissatisfied proponents of local control have renewed their initiative threats. 6 
 
1. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). Thomas Jefferson embraced this concept 
from JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (Alexander Campbell Fraser ed., Dover 
Publications 1959) (1690). 
2. Greg Overstreet, Re-Empowering the Native American: A Conservative Proposal to Restore Tribal 
Sovereignty and Self-Reliance to Federal Indian Policy, 14 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (1993) (citing 
Pub. Papers of Ronald Reagan 96 (Jan. 24, 1983)); see also Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address in 
Washington, D.C., para. 4 (Mar. 4, 1801), available at http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres16.html/ (“[Y]ou 
should understand what I deem the essential principles of our Government, and consequently those which ought 
to shape its Administration. I will compress them within the narrowest compass they will bear . . . .”). 
3. See, e.g., John R. Nolon & Steven E. Galvin, Hydrofracking: State Preemption, Local Power, and 
Cooperative Governance, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 995 (2012–2013); Robert H. Freilich, Neil M. Popowitz, 
Oil and Gas Fracking: State and Federal Regulation Does not Preempt Needed Local Government Regulation, 
44 URB. LAW. 533 (2012); Sorell E. Negro, Fracking Wars: Federal, State and Local Conflicts over the 
Regulation of Natural Gas Activities, 35 ZONING AND PLANNING LAW REPORT (No. 2 Feb. 2012), available at 
http://www.ourenergypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Fracking-Wars.pdf (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review); Michelle L. Kennedy, Exercise of Local Control over Gas Extraction, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. 
REV. 375 (2010–2011). 
4. Lynn Bartels, Big Spenders Energize Fight over Initiatives, DENVER POST, May 12, 2014, at 1A; see 
also Mark Jaffe & Aldo Svaldi, Battles Over Local Control Energized, DENVER POST, May 1, 2014, at 1A. 
5. Maeve Reston, Deal Will Keep Fracking Battle Off Colorado Ballot, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2014, 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/politicsnow/la-pn-colorado-deal-fracking-ballot-20140804-
story.html#page=1 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also Mark Jaffe, Hickenlooper Compromise 
Keeps Oil and Gas Measures Off Colorado Ballot, DENVER POST, Aug. 4, 2014, http://www.denverpost. 
com/business/ci_26272493/hickenlooper-tries-broker-last-minute-deal-oil-gas-colorado (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
6. Task Force Proposes Fracking Rules to Colorado Governor, NPR (Feb. 27, 2015), http://www. 
npr.org/2015/02/27/389454418/task-force-proposes-fracking-rules-to-colorado-governor (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review); see also Bruce Finley, Colorado Anti-Fracking Groups Launch Campaign for 
Statewide Ban, DENVER POST, Feb. 24, 2015, http://www.denverpost.com/environment/ci_27591553/colorado-
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These measures reflected the state legislature’s failure to resolve escalating turf 
battles and lawsuits over the authority of the statewide Colorado Oil and Gas 
Conservation Commission to preempt such local control.7 
Forgotten in this fray is the fact that renewable energy resources in a majority 
of states have no comparable statewide agency to facilitate the siting and 
regulatory processes.8 Many have argued that a “one-stop” procedure would help 
mitigate the risks and delays that jeopardize renewable resources under the 
current decentralized siting process.9 Because California has a statewide energy 
agency that provides a siting process for most energy generation facilities but not 
for wind or photovoltaic (PV) solar power,10 this article will examine the impact 
of moving to a “superagency”11 solution for these resources in California. 
Part II provides an overview of energy siting processes in most states. Part III 
describes the forces that led to the creation of California’s superagency, the 
Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission, also called the 
California Energy Commission (Energy Commission), and the scope of the 
Energy Commission’s jurisdiction. Part IV explains the Energy Commission’s 
siting process and its advantages over the current process required for most 
renewable projects in California. With compelling arguments for why large-scale 
renewables should be included under Energy Commission jurisdiction, this 
 
anti-fracking-groups-launch-campaign-statewide-ban (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
7. Bartels, supra note 4, at 1A; see generally K.K. DuVivier, Sins of the Father, 1 TEX. A&M J. REAL 
PROP. L. 391, 400–09 (2014) (describing the evolution of laws surrounding oil and gas). 
8. See Ronald H. Rosenberg, Making Renewable Energy A Reality—Finding Ways to Site Wind Power 
Facilities, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 635, 672–77 (2008) (describing the varied approaches to 
wind power facility siting). 
9. See, e.g., Brian Troxler, Note, Stifling the Wind: California Environmental Quality Act and Local 
Permitting, 38 COLUM. J. ENVTL L. 163, 171 (2013) (arguing that a centralized state agency would be 
preferable to local control); Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 679–80 (arguing for a “lead” state agency to oversee 
wind and energy facility siting); Patricia E. Salkin & Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Cooperative Federalism and 
Wind: A New Framework for Achieving Sustainability, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1049, 1065–71, 1076–79, 1092 
(2009) (describing local, state, and federal regulation of wind development and resulting challenges to 
development and arguing for a “federal wind siting policy”); Hannah Wiseman, Expanding Regional Renewable 
Governance, 35 HARV. ENVT. L. REV. 477, 528–38 (2011) (describing the multiple layers of regulation and 
property rights that apply to large renewable developments and arguing for regional energy boards). 
10. See Warren-Alquist State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Act, CAL PUB. RES. 
CODE § 25120 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014) (indicating that wind, hydroelectric, and solar photovoltaic facilities 
are not considered thermal power plants for the purposes of the Act). Currently, there are two primary 
technologies for solar energy generation: solar thermal and solar photovoltaics (PV). PV involves the direct 
conversion of light into electricity through the photoelectric effect. When PV materials absorb light, they 
release electrons. The electrons are captured by conductors, creating an electric current. This results in solar PV 
energy. See Gil Knier, How Do Photovoltaics Work?, NASA SCIENCE NEWS (last updated Apr. 6, 2011), 
http://science.nasa.gov/science-news/science-at-nasa/2002/solarcells/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
11. See Superagency for the Energy Gap, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1973, available at http://www.energy. 
ca.gov/reports/Warren-Alquist_Act/history/1973-74_AB_1575_news.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (describing the formation of the Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission in the 
1970s). 
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Article concludes by urging California to shoulder its role-model status by 
making this change.12 
II. ENERGY SITING PROCESSES 
“[T]he right to use the land and its natural resources” is generally within a 
state’s police power13 and delegated to local governments.14 This “traditional 
state-to-local delegation of land use authority” changed in the 1970s.15 Electric 
utilities conducted studies in the 1960s that showed “annual industrial growth of 
seven to eight percent—a rate that would require ‘the doubling of electric 
generating capacity every ten years.’”16 Some of these studies also “concluded 
that nuclear power plants would provide electricity at substantially cheaper rates 
than coal-fired plants.”17 
Nuclear power was not popular with segments of the public, so “the National 
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners developed a model siting 
statute”18 “to speed construction of nuclear power plants.”19 Several states 
responded by creating state-level agencies to “streamline challenges to site 
approvals” and “prevent parochial preference from blocking new power plants.”20 
Twenty states now have some mandatory state agency control of energy 
facility siting: “Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, 
New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, [and] 
Wisconsin.”21 However, a number of states with statewide agencies regulating 
some power plant siting do not include renewable energy siting within those 
 
12. Although an argument could be made that smaller energy projects should also be a part of the 
integrated planning process, this article focuses on facilities comparable to those currently under Energy 
Commission siting authority which must be at least 50 megawatts (MW). See infra notes 82–85 and 
accompanying text (describing the Energy Commission’s jurisdiction). 
13. John R. Nolon, Historical Overview of the American Land Use System: A Diagnostic Approach to 
Evaluating Governmental Land Use Control, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 821, 821 (2006). 
14. Daniel R. Mandelker, Fred Bosselman’s Legacy to Land Use Reform, 17 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 
11, 13 (2001). 
15. Uma Outka, The Renewable Energy Footprint, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 241, 257–58 (2011). 
16. Paul Rodgers & Charles D. Gray, State Commission Treatment of Nuclear Plant Cancellation Costs, 
13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443, 444 n.6 (1985) (quoting Pat Wechsler, Nuclear Power: Who Foots the Bill?, DUN’S 
BUS. MONTH, June 1984, at 70–71) (citing Cook, Nuclear Follies, FORBES, Feb. 11, 1985, at 88). 
17. Id. at 444 n.7 (citing ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NUCLEAR PLANT 
CANCELLATIONS: CAUSES, COSTS, AND CONSEQUENCES 28 (Apr. 1983)). 
18. Outka, supra note 15, at 257. 
19. Big Energy Bill Signed by Reagan, UNITED PRESS, May 22, 1974, available at http://www. 
energy.ca.gov/reports/Warren-Alquist_Act/history/1973-74_AB_1575_news.pdf (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review). 
20. Outka, supra note 15, at 258. 
21. Id. “[M]any of the states with centralized authorities afford one-stop permitting for very large 
facilities only. North Dakota and Massachusetts, for example, certify energy facilities greater than 100 MW, 
while New York’s threshold is 80 MW, Florida’s is 75 MW, Ohio’s is 50 MW . . . .” Id. at 266 n.127. 
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agencies’ jurisdictions.22 Below is a summary of the current status of wind 
generation siting processes.23 Fewer statewide agencies address solar PV.24 
First, at least ten states25 have statewide siting authority over large-scale26 
wind energy generation: Connecticut,27 Maine,28 Massachusetts,29 Minnesota,30 
Nevada,31 New Hampshire,32 Ohio,33 Oregon,34 South Dakota,35 and Vermont.36 
 
22. Hannah Wiseman et al., Formulating a Law of Sustainable Energy: The Renewables Component, 28 
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 827, 871–72 (2011). 
23. It is beyond the scope of this particular Article to cover the full range and current state of all 50 states’ 
utility siting regimes. The text of this Article generally sets out Ronald H. Rosenberg’s analysis. See Rosenberg, 
supra note 8, at 673–77 (setting forth the various approaches to state siting processes). Alternatively, Hannah 
Wiseman, Lindsay Grisamer, and E. Nichole Saunders note that there are “three core types of municipal 
governance approaches to renewable technologies (banning, ignoring, or specifically addressing renewables) 
[and] four different types of state regimes”: (1) fully centralized, preempting local authority; (2) hybrid regimes 
with “centralized approval . . . and partial preemption . . . directing municipalities to include minimum 
requirements”; (3) hybrid regimes with “a centralized siting process[,] but leav[ing] zoning to” locals, some 
with “optional preemption of local zoning powers”; and (4) regimes “leav[ing] nearly all regulation of 
renewable development to” local governments. Wiseman et al., supra note 22, at 881–82. 
24. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Energy’s Solar America Cities Program, the U.S. Department of 
Energy’s SunShot Initiative that address some of the challenges solar PV faces. California has made a short-
term exception for utility-scale solar PV. See infra Part III.B. 
25. Rosenberg lists seven: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oregon, Vermont, and 
Virginia. Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 676–77. See infra note 40 about Virginia. 
26. Note from the statutes in the following citations that the size of facilities large enough to warrant 
statewide siting supervision varies from state to state. See infra notes 27–36. In addition to the ten listed here, 
Brian Troxler lists Rhode Island as “regulating state siting of wind project of forty MW or more.” Troxler, 
supra note 9, 190 n.219. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-98-1 to -20 (2006 & Supp. 2010) regulates the siting of “major 
energy facilities,” which are those capable of operating at 40 MW or more, but wind facilities are not 
specifically mentioned in the siting statute. 
27. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-50kk (2013) (authorizing the Connecticut Siting Council to adopt 
regulations for the siting of wind turbines). 
28. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, §§ 3451–3459 (2010 & Supp. 2013). The act became effective in 
2008 and designates the Department of Environmental Protection as the primary siting authority for grid-scale 
wind energy development in organized areas of the state. Id. tit. 35-A, § 3451(8). The Maine Land Use Planning 
Commission may also designate expedited permitting areas in the State’s unorganized and deorganized areas 
and is the primary siting authority for wind energy developments that are not grid-scale and that are in the 
unorganized and deorganized areas. Id. 
29. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, §§1, 69H (West 2003) (designating the Energy Facilities Siting 
Board as the siting authority for energy generating facilities). Section 1 has existed since 1973. Id. ch. 164, § 1. 
In 1997, a definition of “renewable energy,” which included wind, was added to section 1. 1997 Mass. Legis. 
Serv. ch. 164 (West). In 2008, a definition of “alternative energy development,” which includes wind, was also 
added to section 1. 2008 Mass. Legis. Serv. ch. 169 (West). 
30. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 216F.01.2, 216F.04, 216F.07 (West 2010) (requiring all large wind energy 
conversation systems to obtain a site permit from the Public Utilities Commission and preempting any local 
authority to issue such permits). Chapter 216F, entitled “Wind Energy Conversion Systems,” was first enacted 
in 1995, with amendments in 2004, 2007, and 2008. Id. § 216F.01–.09. It preempts local regulations and zoning 
ordinances for wind projects over a certain size with a permit system administered by the Minnesota Public 
Utilities Commission. Id. §§ 216F.04, 216F.07 
31. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 704.820–.900 (West 2014) (requiring the Nevada Public Utilities 
Commission to site wind facilities greater than seventy MW). Section 704.7811, including wind in the 
definition of “[r]enewable energy” was add ed in 2001. Id. § 704.7811. The definition was incorporated into 
section 704.860 defining “[u]tility facility” in 2005 along with provisions for net metering. 2005 Nev. Legis. 
Serv. ch. 425 (West). 
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Second, at least five states have a “State/Local Government Hybrid 
Approach” with respect to wind resources: California, Montana, New Mexico, 
Washington, and Wisconsin.37 These approaches include technical assistance 
from the state or shared responsibility through voluntary guidelines, model 
ordinances, and power siting rules following state models.38 
Finally, aside from the fifteen states listed in the previous two categories, 
most of the rest of the country uses “[l]ocal [g]overnment [c]ontrol [t]hrough 
[c]onventional [l]and [u]se [c]ontrols and [p]rocedures” to regulate the siting of 
wind or solar PV generation facilities.39 Some states have recently shifted from 
 
32. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 162-H:2 to -H:4 (2014) (providing that the New Hampshire Site Evaluation 
Committee regulate the siting of wind facilities over thirty MW and allowing smaller facilities to opt in to state 
regulation to preempt local regulation) A definition of “[r]enewable energy facility” was added to section 162-
H:2 in 2007. 2008 N.H Laws ch. 364. The definition includes facilities “powered by wind energy.” Id. § 162-
H:2. 
33. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4906.01-.99 (2014) (regulating the installation of facilities with a capacity 
of fifty MW or more). Section 4906.13, was amended to define “economically significant wind farm,” in 2008. 
2008 Ohio Legis. Serv. Ann. ch. 120 (West). Section 4906.98, also amended in 2008, added “economically 
significant wind farm” to the permit requirement for “major utility facilities.” Id. Section 4906.20, which 
regulates “[e]conomically significant wind farms,” was added in 2008 and applies to facilities with an aggregate 
capacity of between five and fifty MW. Id. Larger facilities would be subject to the utility-siting provisions 
applicable to “major utility facilities” in sections 4906.01-.99. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4906.01. See also id. 
§ 713.081 (effective June 24, 2008) (giving local governments siting and other regulatory authority over 
“[s]mall wind farms,” which are facilities that operate at an aggregate capacity of less than five MW.) 
34. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 469.300(11)(J), 469.320, 469.401 (West 2003 & Supp. 2014) (providing for 
statewide site certification of wind power facilities with a capacity of thirty-five MW or more, with a provision 
allowing facilities with less capacity to opt in to state certification, after which local governments must issue 
their permits subject to the conditions contained in the site certificate). The definition of “[e]nergy facility” in 
section 469.300 was amended in 2001 to include “[a]n electric power generating plant with an average electric 
generating capacity of 35 megawatts or more if the power is produced from . . . wind energy . . . .” Or. Legis. 
Serv. ch. 134 (2001). Section 469.320 was amended in 2001 to permit facilities generating less than 35 MW 
from wind to opt in to the site certificate program. Id. ch. 683 (2001). 
35. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 49-41B-1 to -38 (2015) (providing for statewide siting of wind projects with 
100 MW capacity or more). In 2005, the definition of “[f]acility” was amended to include “wind energy 
facility,” and a definition of “[w]ind energy facility” was added to the statute. 2005 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 250. 
The term was also inserted into other relevant provisions in the siting statute. Id. 
36. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 248 (West 2014) (requiring the Vermont Public Service Board to site all 
wind energy facilities except those for on-site energy consumption). In 2009, this section was amended to 
include subsection (o), which provides that a petition for a wind energy generation facility cannot be rejected as 
incomplete if it does not specify information about the turbines. 2009 Vt. Legis. Serv. ch. 45 (West). This is the 
only mention of wind in § 248, which suggests that wind-generation facilities were always included in the siting 
statute. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 248. See also id. tit. 3 § 2840 (West 2014) (enacted May 27, 2009) 
(authorizing the siting of wind energy generation facilities on state lands.) 
37. Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 675–76. Note that WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 80.50.010 to .904 (West 
2001 & Supp. 2014) includes a 2007 amendment to § 80.50.020 that added “alternative energy resource” 
(which includes wind facilities) to the definition of “energy facilities” subject to the statewide siting statute 
requiring the Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council to site all facilities over 350 MW and allowing renewable 
facilities to opt into the state process rather than use the local permitting process. 2007 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 
325 (West); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 80.50.060. 
38. Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 675–76. 
39. See id. at 673 (specifically listing “Oregon, Illinois, Kansas . . . , Texas, Idaho, North Carolina, New 
Hampshire, Iowa, Utah, Nevada, and Colorado”); Wiseman et al., supra note 22, at 871 (“The majority of states 
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statewide siting to local control.40 Thus, these states regulate project siting with 
zoning and land use control law under traditional local police powers.41 
If a community favors a renewable energy project, then delegation of power 
at this local level can expedite permitting and siting.42 While promoting clean 
energy generally appears to be a good thing for all involved, both locally and 
globally, the decision requires a careful balancing of “economic, environmental, 
and safety concerns.”43 With limited budgets to hire experts, it is likely that “local 
land use planning officials could be overwhelmed by sophisticated applicants and 
their consultants, leading to quick project approval with limited analysis and few 
protective conditions.”44 
More problematic for energy development companies (and the climate, 
assuming it benefits from cleaner energy sources) is the possibility that a clean 
energy project will be challenged or completely blocked at the local level based 
on emotions rather than facts.45 Consequently, the public may benefit from 
having a statewide agency to make decisions following consistent criteria and 
with the expertise to consider both local and extra-local benefits.46 
Finally, the challenges of addressing a panoply of different regulations47 and 
the vagaries of unpredictable and lengthy local processes can create stifling, if 
not suffocating, risks that drive up costs and make it impossible for renewable 
energy generation to compete with conventional energy sources for investment 
 
have not preempted local authority over the siting of utility-scale renewable generation . . . .”); id. at 842 (“The 
current legal system that governs renewable energy development consists of an incoherent patchwork of 
statutes, regulations, and common law court decisions geared toward older, nonrenewable technologies.”). See 
generally Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877 (2011) (arguing for 
local control of renewable energy projects); Uma Outka, Siting Renewable Energy: Land Use and Regulatory 
Context, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1041 (2010) (discussing renewable energy siting law in Florida); Donald Zillman et 
al., More Than Tilting At Windmills, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 10 (2009) (describing the “array of local policies 
and regulations” that may apply to wind farm siting). 
40. See, for example, the state of Virginia. In 2008, Rosenberg listed Virginia among the states with a 
state-controlled siting process. Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 676. However, in 2011, VA. CODE ANN. § 67-103 
(West 2014) was enacted, stating that local governments can develop ordinances for the siting of renewable 
energy facilities generating electricity from wind and that the local ordinances must be consistent with the 
Commonwealth’s energy policy. 
41. Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 673. 
42. See Alexa Burt Engelman, Against the Wind: Conflict over Wind Energy Siting, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10549, 10561 (2011) (noting that “early and effective engagement of the affected public” may result in less 
opposition to siting proposals). 
43. Troxler, supra note 9, at 171. 
44. Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 675. 
45. See, e.g., Engelman, supra note 42, at 10556–59 (describing the battle that erupted in Hammond, New 
York over wind energy development). 
46. See Outka, supra note 15, at 305–06 (arguing that siting decisions must be made in light of 
“cumulative, not just site-specific, impacts”); Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 679 (arguing that a state agency is the 
most appropriate body to site wind energy facilities because it is in the best position to assess state and regional 
interests). 
47. Troxler, supra note 9, at 171–72 (describing the “high transaction costs of navigating through a 
regulatory maze” of local regulations). 
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dollars.48 Centralized, state-level siting authority could address all of these cost, 
expertise, efficiency, and environmental concerns.49 The following Part III 
describes California’s state-level energy agency, which might serve as a role 
model for other states. 
III. CALIFORNIA’S ENERGY “SUPERAGENCY” 
With over 38 million people in 2013, California is by far the most populous 
state in America.50 Texas is a distant second with about 26.4 million.51 New York 
and Florida are vying for third place with around 19.6 million each.52 By 2050, 
California is projected to have a population of 50 million.53 
In terms of gross domestic product, California is also a global giant.54 In 
2012, California was “in a virtual tie” with the Russian Federation and Italy, each 
with an economy of approximately $2 trillion.55 In 2013, California was poised to 
surpass these two countries to rank as the eighth largest economy in the world.56 
By almost every measure, California is a national57 and world leader58 with 
respect to energy. California is also a leader in terms of renewable energy.59 
 
48. See generally id. at 177–88 (describing the cost to wind energy developers of complying with CEQA 
and decentralized siting requirements). 
49.  See id. at 188 (concluding that state-controlled siting “would alleviate the uncertainty surrounding 
permitting, which would in turn alleviate investment barriers without sacrificing environmental review”). 
50. U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last 
visited June 30, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH, CALIFORNIA @ 50 
MILLION: CALIFORNIA’S CLIMATE FUTURE 8 (drft. 2013), available at http://opr.ca.gov/docs/EGPR_Review 
Draft.pdf [hereinafter CALIFORNIA @ 50 MILLION] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
54. See California Posed to Move Up in World Economic Rankings in 2013, NUMBERS IN THE NEWS 
(Center for Continuing Study of the California Economy, Palo Alto, Cal.), July 2013, at 1, available at 
http://www.ccsce.com/PDF/Numbers-July-2013-CA-Economy-Rankings-2012.pdf (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review) (comparing the largest economies in the world, including California). 
55. Id. 
56. Id. Only the following 7 countries were ahead of California: United States ($15.7 trillion); China 
($8.2 trillion); Japan ($6 trillion); Germany ($3.4 trillion); France ($2.6 trillion); UK ($2.4 trillion); Brazil ($2.3 
trillion)). Id. 
57. See, e.g., CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, PUB. NO. CEC-100-2013-001-CMF, 2013 INTEGRATED ENERGY 
POLICY REPORT 1 (2013), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2013publications/CEC-100-2013-001/CEC-
100-2013-001-CMF.pdf [hereinafter 2013 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT] (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review) (“California continues to lead the nation in designing and implementing innovative policies an 
strategies to use energy more efficiently, replace fossil fuels with renewable resources, and develop the 
infrastructure needed to deliver safe, reliable, and affordable energy to consumers and businesses throughout the 
state”); CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, PUB. NO. CEC-150-2011-002-LCF-REV1, RENEWABLE POWER IN 
CALIFORNIA: STATUS AND ISSUES 22 (Dec. 2011), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2011publications/ 
CEC-150-2011-002/CEC-150-2011-002-LCF-REV1.pdf [hereinafter 2011 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY 
REPORT] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“In 1980, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission . . . 
followed California’s lead by adopting the requirement for standard contracts priced at full avoided cost for 
utility purchases of electricity from qualifying facilities.”). 
58. See 2013 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT, supra note 57, at 35 (describing how California’s 
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According to the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, California is ranked 
first for installed capacity of solar PV, concentrating solar power, and 
geothermal, and is second for biomass and hydropower.60 In addition, California 
was number one for installed wind energy capacity in 2000,61 but it has since 
languished in comparison to a twentyfold growth nationwide, primarily in more 
regulatory-friendly states.62 Currently, wind power generation is not regulated by 
the statewide Energy Commission, but an argument can be made that moving it 
under the auspices of that agency might improve its success.63 
The following subparts describe first the creation of the Energy Commission 
and second the scope of its jurisdiction. 
A. Creation of the California Energy Commission 
The Energy Commission was created in 1974 through the Warren-Alquist 
Act.64 Faced with the prospect of up to 120 new nuclear reactors to meet 
California’s projected energy needs by 2000,65 the State Assembly figured out a 
way to meet the needs of both utility companies and constituents urging 
 
actions influence China and the rest of the world); id. at 309 (calling California a “world leader in its efforts to 
address climate change by reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions”). California’s Low Carbon Fuel 
Standard, established in 2007, aims to significantly reduce California’s contributions to worldwide Greenhouse 
Gas emission levels. 2011 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT, supra note 57, at 24. 
59. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE ENERGY, 2011 
RENEWABLE ENERGY DATA BOOK 31 (2013), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/54909.pdf (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review) (ranking California in the top three states for “Renewable Electricity Installed 
Capacity” in all six energy categories discussed). 
60. Id. 
61. Troxler, supra note 9, at 163 (observing that “California led the nation in installed wind energy 
capacity” in 2000, with over 1,600 MW of the nation’s total installed wind energy capacity of 2,472 
megawatts). 
62. Id. at 164 (“[S]ince 2000, wind capacity in the United States has increased twentyfold to almost 
50,000MW, while capacity in California has less than tripled.”). Troxler points out “that wind projects 
developed in California and New England from 2009 through 2011 were significantly more expensive than 
comparative projects in other regions,” with a cost in California and New England of $2,500 per kilowatt in 
comparison to the national average of $2,160 per kilowatt. Id. at 177. 
63. Id. at 165, 195 (positing that “[t]he combination of decentralized siting and stringent environmental 
evaluation shrouds the cost, outcome, and timeline of the permitting process in uncertainty, chilling investment 
in new [California wind] capacity” and concluding that “California could alleviate these barriers, without 
necessarily detracting from environmental review, by centralizing permitting authority [for wind] in the 
California Energy Commission and consolidating its licensing and environmental review process”). 
64. 1974 Cal. Stat. 25005.5. Then California Governor, Ronald Reagan, vetoed the first version of the bill 
in 1973. Larry Pryor, Reagan Under Fire for Veto of Energy Conservation Bill, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1973, 
available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/reports/Warren-Alquist_Act/history/1973-74_AB_1575_news.pdf (on 
file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
65. Energy Crisis Bill Gets an OK, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 10, 1973, available at http://www.energy. 
ca.gov/reports/Warren-Alquist_Act/history/1973-74_AB_1575_news.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review). The measure was instigated by a report from the Rand Corporation that “recommended that the state 
should spend more time trying to conserve energy by increasing efficiency and less on just building new power 
plants.” Id. 
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conservation and environmental protection.66 California legislators placed the 
authority to regulate the siting of electric power plants in the same agency that 
was charged with researching energy conservation and new forms of energy.67 
Because this new agency had the power to look beyond traditional utility-
siting authority, the Los Angeles Times called it a “superagency.”68 The concept 
of this superagency structure was alarming to some in the 1970s.69 Then 
California Governor Ronald Reagan vetoed the first version of the bill,70 and 
when he finally signed the legislation, the state energy coordinator resigned 
warning that the commission was a “dangerous concentration of authority.”71 Yet 
reviews of the Energy Commission’s performance have concluded that the 
process works and is an appropriate balance of speed and oversight,72 allowing 
power plants to be sited in an “expeditious and environmentally considerate 
manner.”73 
B. Current Scope of the Energy Commission’s Jurisdiction 
The current version of the Warren-Alquist Act is close to two hundred pages 
long and incorporates twelve chapters, addressing everything from the 
Commission’s management to its research programs.74 One of the most laudable 
features of California’s energy regime is the legislative mandate, added to the 
statute in 2002,75 requiring that the Energy Commission prepare an “integrated 
energy policy report” every two years.76 The legislative charge is broad: the 
Commission must “conduct assessments and forecasts of all aspects of energy 
industry supply, production, transportation, delivery and distribution, demand, 
and prices” and “use these assessments and forecasts to develop energy policies 
 
66. See Superagency for the Energy Gap, supra note 11 (describing the powers of the proposed Energy 
Resources Conservation and Development Commission, including siting authority for power plants, 
conservation measures, and research and development of additional sources of energy). 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Pryor, supra note 64 (describing the opposition of privately-owned utilities to the first version of the 
Warren-Alquist bill). 
70. Id. 
71. Big Energy Bill Signed by Reagan, supra note 19 (quoting California State Energy Coordinator 
Wesley G. Bruer). 
72. SUSAN F. TIERNEY & PAUL J. HIBBARD, SITING POWER PLANTS: RECENT EXPERIENCE IN CALIFORNIA 
AND BEST PRACTICES IN OTHER STATES 4 (2002), available at http://www.issuelab.org/click/download1/ 
siting_power_plants_recent_experience_in_california_and_best_practices_in_other_states (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
73. Power Plant Siting Proceedings FAQs, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, http://www.energy.ca.gov/public_ 
adviser/power_plant_siting_faq.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
74. Warren-Alquist State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Act, CAL PUB. RES. CODE § 
25000–990 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014). 
75. 2002 Cal. Stat. 3243. 
76. PUB. RES. § 25302(a). The first report was required to be issued in 2003. Id. The most recent report 
was issued in 2013. 2013 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT, supra note 57. 
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that conserve resources, protect the environment, ensure energy reliability, 
enhance the state’s economy, and protect public health and safety.”77 One of the 
objectives of the reporting requirement is “to encourage cooperation among the 
various state agencies with energy responsibilities[,]”78 and creating the report 
requires the Energy Commission to consult and coordinate with at least nine 
other state agencies that have additional jurisdiction over energy issues.79 
Despite its coordinating role and broad mandate to “[s]erve as a central 
repository within the state government” for energy data and recommendations,80 
the Energy Commission’s actual jurisdiction to make decisions is more limited.81 
Since the original enactment of the statute, the Energy Commission’s primary 
jurisdiction is “the exclusive power to certify all sites and related facilities in the 
state, whether . . . new . . . or a change or addition to an existing facility.”82 
A further limitation on the Energy Commission’s authority is that the 
definition of “[f]acility” includes only an “electric transmission line or thermal 
powerplant”83 “using any source of thermal energy, with a generating capacity of 
50 megawatts [MW]or more . . . .”84 The statute explicitly states that “‘[t]hermal 
powerplant’ does not include any wind, hydroelectric, or solar photovoltaic 
electrical generating facility.”85 
As a result of this now seemingly irrational carve out,86 the Energy 
Commission reported that “[m]ore than half of the 9,435 MW of large-scale 
renewable generation permitted in 2010 fell under the purview of local 
 
77. PUB. RES. § 25301(a). 
78. Id. § 25300(e). 
79. Id. §§ 25301(a), 25302(e). These agencies include (1) the Public Utilities Commission; (2) the Office 
of Ratepayer Advocates; (3) the California Air Resources Board; (4) the Electricity Oversight Board; (5) the 
Independent System Operator; (6) the Department of Water Resources; (7) the California Consumer Power and 
Conservation Financing Authority; (8) the Department of Transportation; and (9) the Department of Motor 
Vehicles. Id. 
80. Id. § 2516.5(d) (The Energy Commission is to “[s]erve as a central repository within the state 
government for the collection, storage, retrieval, and dissemination of data and information on all forms of 
energy supply, demand, conservation, public safety, research, and related subjects. The data and information 
shall be derived from all sources, including, but not be limited to, electric and gas utilities, oil and other energy 
producing companies, institutions of higher education, private industry, public and private research laboratories, 
private individuals, and from any other source that the commission determines is necessary to carry out its 
objectives under this division.”). 
81. See id. § 25216 (describing duties consisting largely of collecting data, making assessments and 
recommendations, and performing research and development); id. § 25410.6 (describing the Energy 
Commission’s role in administering the State Energy Conservation Assistance Account). 
82. Id. § 25500. 
83. Id. § 25110 (defining “[f]acility”). 
84. Id. § 25120 (defining “[t]hermal powerplant”). 
85. Id. § 25120. But cf. infra note 169 (discussing California Public Utilities Code section 25500.1). 
86. At the time the Warren-Alquist Act was passed, utility-scale wind turbines had not yet been 
developed. See, e.g., Energy Timelines: Wind, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/kids/energy. 
cfm?page=tl_wind (last visited Nov. 14, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (indicating that the 
first wind turbine capable of generating over one MW did not begin operating until 1979, and that it was not 
until the 1980s that some of the first wind turbines were installed in California). 
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governments” instead of the centralized Energy Commission process.87 In 
comparison to the hundreds, if not thousands, of separate local governmental 
entities from which renewable energy projects might need to seek approval, 88 the 
advantages of the Energy Commission permitting process described in Part IV, 
help make a compelling argument that large-scale renewable projects should be 
centralized under the Energy Commission’s jurisdiction.89 
IV. THE ENERGY COMMISSION’S ENERGY SITING PROCESS 
Despite the carve-outs for wind and solar PV mentioned in Part III.B, the 
Energy Commission’s authority is broad, and its certification process is 
comprehensive.90 It all starts when an applicant files an application for 
certification of a site.91 After receiving the application and reviewing it for 
sufficiency,92 the Energy Commission takes the lead role in giving notice of the 
application to the California Attorney General, relevant federal and state 
agencies, and the public through newspaper publication.93 
Perhaps most significantly, however, the Energy Commission forwards the 
application to “local governmental agencies having land use and related 
jurisdiction in the area of the proposed site and related facility[,]” seeking review 
and comments on “the design of the facility, architectural and aesthetic features 
of the facility, access to highways, landscaping and grading, public use of lands 
in the area of the facility, and other appropriate aspects of the design, 
construction, or operation of the proposed site and related facility.”94 This step 
satisfies the Energy Commission’s responsibility to ensure that a project 
conforms to applicable federal, state, local, or regional laws, ordinances, 
regulations, and standards (LORS).95 While the Energy Commission certification 
process coordinates and considers all LORS, the Energy Commission’s 
 
87. 2011 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT, supra note 577, at 219. 
88. See id. (reporting that California has 58 counties, 482 incorporated cities, and 3,400 special districts). 
While special district approval might not often be required, Ken Alex noted that “local jurisdiction still has a lot 
of control over where energy facilities are cited.” Ken Alex, Senior Policy Advisor, State of California, Office 
of Governor & Director, State of California, Governor’s Office of Planning and Research, Remarks at the 
McGeorge Law Review Symposium: California’s Future and What Does the Environment Look Like? (Apr. 11, 
2014).  
89. See Troxler, supra note 9, at 170 (describing a wind project in Kern County that had to obtain 
approval from eight local, four state, and three federal agencies). 
90. See generally CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 25500–43 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014). 
91. Id. § 25519(a). 
92. See id. § 25520 (listing the required contents of the application). 
93. Id. § 25519(g). The Energy Commission may also be required to notify the Public Utilities 
Commission. Id. § 25519(j). 
94. Id. § 25519(f). 
95. Laws, Ordinances, Regulations and Standards in Siting Cases, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, http://www. 
energy.ca.gov/public_adviser/lors_faq.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review). 
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“exclusive power to certify” means the certificate it issues is “in lieu of” and 
“supersedes” all LORS from other jurisdictions, including the federal 
government when allowed.96 
The next phases of the site certification process include discovery and 
analysis.97 The Energy Commission staff gathers data from all sectors and 
prepares a Preliminary Staff Assessment and then a Formal Staff Assessment for 
the two commissioners assigned to the application.98 
The following stage is one that sets the Commission certification process 
apart: “[f]ormal evidentiary hearings are held . . . to hear the findings and 
conclusions of the applicant, staff, intervenors, and other agencies through 
written, oral and documentary testimony in order to make a decision based on 
evidence.”99 In this formal quasi-adjudicatory process, all parties, including 
approved intervenors, have an opportunity to submit sworn testimony and cross-
examine witnesses.100 Non-party members of the public are also “encouraged to 
present oral and written comments.”101 The adjudicatory hearings must be 
scheduled 90 to 240 days after the date the application is filed.102 To allow for 
public input, the hearings are held in one of four major cities nearest the 
proposed site and may also be held in the county in which the site will be 
located.103 The Energy Commission has discretion to determine the number of 
hearings and how they are to be conducted to “provide a reasonable opportunity 
for the public and all parties . . . to comment upon the application and the 
commission staff assessment . . . .”104 In fact, “public adviser[s]” are nominated 
by the Energy Commission and appointed by the California Governor to educate 
the public and encourage participation.105 
After the formal adjudicatory hearing or hearings on an application, the 
Energy Commission must prepare a written decision concerning the application, 
including “[s]pecific provisions relating to the manner in which the proposed 
facility is to be designed, sited, and operated in order to protect environmental 
quality and assure public health and safety”106 and “[a] discussion of any public 
benefits from the project including, but not limited to, economic benefits, 
 
96.  PUB. RES. § 25500. 
97. See Six Phases of the Power Plant Siting Process, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, http://www. 
energy.ca.gov/public_adviser/six_phases.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (listing discovery and analysis phases following the data adequacy phase). 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. CAL. CODE OF REGS. tit. 20, § 1712(b) (2014). 
101. Six Phases of the Power Plant Siting Process, supra note 97; see also Power Plant Siting 
Proceedings FAQs, supra note 73. 
102. CAL PUB. RES. CODE § 25521 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014). 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. §§ 25217.1, 25222; CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 20, §§ 2553, 2555. 
106. PUB RES. § 25523(a). 
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environmental benefits, and electricity reliability benefits.”107 The decision phase 
starts with the “Presiding Member’s Proposed Decision” upon which one last 
hearing is held to give the public an opportunity to comment.108 Ultimately, the 
full Energy Commission renders a final decision at one of its regular bi-monthly 
meetings.109 
As discussed below, the Commission process provides three significant 
advantages for applicants and the public: (A) one-stop shopping; (B) an 
alternative to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) review 
requirements;110 and (C) limited judicial review of a Energy Commission 
certification. 
A. One-Stop Shopping 
In 1974, some proponents of the Warren-Alquist Act argued the legislation 
was necessary because “it was virtually impossible for power plant builders to 
secure the permission of the 33 agencies that [had] jurisdiction over location of 
nuclear power plants in California.”111 In contrast, the Energy Commission’s 
licensing procedure “provide[s] a comprehensive ‘one-stop’ process for 
permitting thermal power plants larger than 50 MW . . . .”112 This one-stop 
process can provide at least five advantages. 
First, all applicants must go through the same well-defined Energy 
Commission process.113 Although it might be criticized as “cookie cutter” because 
it “makes all projects step through a very detailed, lengthy and exhaustive 
process irrespective of the proposed impacts,”114 the precedents established by the 
Energy Commission in other cases make the expectations and results fairly 
predictable.115 
 
107. Id. § 25523(h). 
108. Six Phases of the Power Plant Siting Process, supra note 97. 
109. Id. 
110. CEQA is modeled after the federal National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), and has a 
similar two-step review process. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S. & STATE OF CAL., GOVERNOR’S 
OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH, NEPA AND CEQA: INTEGRATING STATE AND FEDERAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEWS 3 (drft. 2013), available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/NEPA_CEQA_Draft_ 
Handbook_March_2013_0.pdf [hereinafter NEPA AND CEQA] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). The 
lead governmental agency conducting the review must make an initial determination if a full report, which in 
California is called an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) and is comparable to the federal Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS), is required. See id. 5–8 (describing the comparable processes of review under CEQA 
and NEPA). 
111. Big Energy Bill Signed by Reagan, supra note 19. 
112. 2011 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT, supra note 57, at 62. 
113. See CAL PUB. RES. CODE § 25517 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014) (stating that a certification from the 
Energy Commission must be obtained prior to constructing any thermal power plant). 
114. E-mail from Dana C. Zentz, Vice President, Commercial Dev., Summit Power Group, LLC & 
Managing Dir. & CEO, NorthLight Power, LLC, to author (May 12, 2014, 5:16 PM) (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
115. See TIERNEY & HIBBARD, supra note 72, at 28 (indicating that siting procedures are most efficient 
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Second, placing the decision in the hands of a statewide agency with 
expertise in various energy generation and conservation concerns and related 
siting issues can increase the likelihood of “institutional competency to evaluate 
applications.”116 This can protect the public from local authorities seeking to 
“race-to-the-bottom” by sacrificing environmental or health values in hopes of 
spurring economic development.117  
Third, the Energy Commission’s process can save an applicant money by 
avoiding “duplication and regulatory uncertainty.”118 While the LORS 
requirements still mean an applicant’s lawyers will have to be familiar with the 
requirements of each federal, state, or local law, ordinance, rule, or standard that 
applies, legal counsel will not have to spend much face-time with each of the key 
administrative personnel from several different jurisdictions.119 In addition, the 
Energy Commission promises “predetermined” flat-fee pricing.120 The public also 
benefit from the efficiency of having a single forum instead of needing to 
monitor the project on multiple fronts and in multiple venues.121  
Fourth, the use of a statewide agency increases the likelihood of a “more 
objective . . . review” that “mitigates the risk that decisions will over-emphasize 
provincial concerns.”122 The larger land footprint required to generate power from 
wind and solar PV sources123 may make it more likely a project would cross more 
jurisdictional boundaries and potentially raise more provincial concerns. 
Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, a statewide agency with exclusive 
jurisdiction, like the Energy Commission, has the additional advantage of 
preemptive power.124 The Energy Commission’s alternative environmental review 
process is described in Part IV.B. Although this process does not avoid any of the 
other agencies that might otherwise be involved in a CEQA review, one benefit is 
the Energy Commission’s energy focus: the Energy Commission has the ultimate 
authority to decide whether the project should proceed even if there are impacts, 
 
when prior agency decisions are made available to subsequent applicants, as in New York, California, and 
Connecticut). 
116. Troxler, supra note 9, at 189. 
117. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (describing the risk of lax environmental review in a local 
siting situation) 
118. Power Plant Siting Proceedings FAQs, supra note 73. 
119. See TIERNEY & HIBBARD, supra note 72, at 7 (indicating that other agencies provide 
recommendations to the Energy Commission rather than directly to the applicant). 
120. Troxler, supra note 9, at 194 (“[D]evelopers pay a flat fee of $255,075, plus $510 per MW at the 
time of filing.”). 
121. See CAL PUB. RES. CODE §§ 25217.1, 25222 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014) (describing the role of the 
advisers available to the public to assist during the Energy Commission siting process). 
122. Troxler, supra note 9, at 189. 
123. See SEAN ONG, ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, LAND-USE 
REQUIREMENTS FOR SOLAR POWER PLANTS IN THE UNITED STATES, at iv (2013), available at http://www.nrel. 
gov/docs/fy13osti/56290.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (observing the “potentially significant 
land use” associated with solar power plants). 
124. See PUB RES. § 25500 (stating that Energy Commission siting jurisdiction preempts any other 
statute, ordinance, or regulation). 
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whereas other regulatory agencies may not be as interested in promoting the 
state’s energy goals that may override environmental considerations.125 
Several states have moved to a statewide wind siting model to put wind 
power generation on a level playing field with other power generation sources 
that enjoy the benefits of a centralized permit process.126 Large-scale wind and 
solar projects in California that do not have the option of permitting through the 
Energy Commission process do not have these advantages. 
B. Alternative CEQA Review 
Virtually all energy projects in California, whether permitted under the 
Energy Commission process or locally, require some sort of approval and 
therefore are subject to CEQA environmental review requirements.127 However, 
the Warren-Alquist Act allows the Energy Commission to conduct its own 
environmental review that is then used “in the same manner as . . . an 
environmental impact report or negative declaration prepared by a lead agency” 
under the standard CEQA process.128  
The Energy Commission’s environmental review process is arguably more 
rigorous than a CEQA review by other lead agencies.129 A standard CEQA review 
is comparable to the environmental review process under the National 
Environmental Policy Act: an agency or governmental body prepares an initial 
study and if necessary, Environmental Impact Report through an informal 
information gathering administrative process.130 In contrast, the Energy 
Commission certification process described above requires submission of 
evidence, cross-examination, and testimony in a formal quasi-judicial 
adjudicatory setting.131  
 
125. Telephone conference between author and Michael J. Levy, formerly Chief Counsel, California 
Energy Commission (June 30, 2014). See also e-mail from Michael J. Levy, former Chief Counsel, California 
Energy Commission, to author (Aug. 25, 2014, 2:21 PM) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
126. See supra Part II (discussing the approaches of various states to energy siting issues). 
127. Even though most energy facilities may not be public or publically funded projects, they are private 
projects that require discretionary approval, so they are subject to CEQA requirements. PUB. RES. § 21080(a); 
Friends of Mammoth v. Bd. of Supervisors of Mono Cnty., 8 Cal. 3d 247, 259 (1972). 
128. PUB RES. § 25519(c). Consequently the California Secretary for Resources has certified the Energy 
Commission’s process as a CEQA equivalent. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15251(j) (2014) (listing “[t]he power 
plant site certification program of the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission 
under Chapter 6 of the Warren-Alquist Act, commencing with Public Resources Code Section 25500“). 
“Section 21080.5 of the Public Resources Code provides that a regulatory program of a state agency shall be 
certified by the Secretary for Resources as being exempt from the requirements for preparing EIRs, negative 
declarations, and initial studies if the Secretary finds that the program meets the criteria contained in that code 
section. A certified program remains subject to other provisions in CEQA such as the policy of avoiding 
significant adverse effects on the environment where feasible.” Id. § 15250. 
129. See PUB. RES. §§ 25519 (a)(l), 25521 (describing the Energy Commission’s environmental review 
process). 
130. See NEPA AND CEQA, supra note 110. 
131. See supra Part IV. 
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Even with the CEQA-equivalent environmental review, in most cases the 
Energy Commission is required to issue a written decision as to an application 
“within 18 months of the filing of an application for certification . . . .”132 A 
California Bureau of State Audits report showed that the average processing time 
of applications during the 1990s was a shorter time period—fourteen months.133 
The CEQA requirements make permitting time for California projects longer 
than in other states,134 and because wind projects do not benefit from the Energy 
Commission review process, the additional time to meet CEQA requirements can 
add significantly more delay.135 A 2013 J.D. candidate at Columbia Law School 
conducted an unpublished survey of the experiences of eight wind farms in Kern 
and Solano Counties in California from 2008 through 2011.136 In this survey, he 
found that the time between filing a notice of preparation and the final CEQA 
Environmental Impact Report137 ranged from 224 days to 1,508 days.138 Thus, in 
contrast to states in which permitting can be completed in less than a year,139 the 
California wind permitting process averages four years.140 
Furthermore, in contrast to NEPA, which simply lists environmental impacts 
of a project, the CEQA process requires mitigation measures to address 
“significant environmental effects” of proposed projects.141 While other lead 
agencies can issue a “statement of overriding considerations” to allow a project 
to go forward even if significant environmental effects are unavoidable,142 the 
 
132. PUB. RES. § 25522(a). If the process to file a notice of intent set out in sections 25501.7 through 
25516.6 applies, then the final decision must be within twelve months if an application “[wa]s filed within one 
year of the commission’s approval of the notice of intent.” Id. 
133. Troxler, supra note 9, at 194. 
134. Robert D. Castro, Developing Wind Projects in California—or Anywhere, POWER MAG. (Dec. 15, 
2007), http://www.powermag.com/developing-wind-projects-in-californiaor-anywhere/ (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
135. See E-mail from Kristen T. Castaños, Partner, Stoel Rives, LLP, to author (May 8, 2014, 5:47 PM) 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“The CEC [Energy Commission] process is lengthy—18 to 24 
months for a new facility, and it can take longer. While this is much longer than a local agency siting process in 
a state like Oregon, it’s not that much longer than a local siting process (for a large project) in CA, where 
CEQA compliance is required.”). 
136. Troxler, supra note 9, at 181 n.144. 
137. An Environmental Impact Report (EIR) is comparable to an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) 
under NEPA. See, e.g., NEPA AND CEQA, supra note 110, at 8. 
138. Troxler, supra note 9, at 181 n.144. 
139. See STOEL RIVES, LLP, THE LAW OF WIND, pt. 2, at 2 (3d ed. 2006), available at http://www.stoel. 
com/Files/LawOfWind_06.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting that locally cited wind projects 
take three to six months to work through the permitting process); NAT’L WIND COORDINATING COMM., SITING 
SUBCOMM., PERMITTING OF WIND ENERGY FACILITIES 10 (rev. 2002), available at http://www.nationalwind. 
org/assets/publications/permitting2002.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting that permitting for 
a wind project usually takes only twelve months). 
140. CTRS. OF EXCELLENCE, ENVIRONMENTAL SCAN: WIND TURBINE TECHNICIANS IN CALIFORNIA 11 
(2009), available at http://www.coeccc.net/environmental_scans/wind_scan_sw_09.pdf. 
141. CAL. CODE REGS.tit. 14, §15091 (2014). 
142. Id. § 15093. 
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Commission alone can include “public convenience and necessity” as a basis for 
overriding any state law, including CEQA requirements.143 
C. Limited Judicial Review 
While not all wind developers in California agree that Energy Commission 
review would be preferable to local permitting, there does appear to be consensus 
on the advantage of at least one aspect of the Energy Commission process—
limited judicial review.144 Reconsideration of an Energy Commission decision 
must occur, if at all, within 30 days after the adoption of a decision or order.145 
Furthermore, judicial review of an Energy Commission decision “on any 
application for certification of a site and related facility” is limited to a petition 
for writ of mandate directly to the Supreme Court of California.146 While a 
handful of applicants have sought such a writ from the California Supreme 
Court,147 that court has never ordered the Energy Commission to overturn a siting 
decision perhaps because the Energy Commission must only adhere to the 
rigorous certification process described above in order to meet the narrow 
procedural review grounds set out in the Warren-Alquist Act.148 Furthermore, the 
Act limits review to the certified record without any additional evidence, 
 
143. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25525 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014). While CEQA statements of overriding 
considerations are common, the public convenience and necessity override of LORS has been used sparingly. 
See, e.g., City Officials Disappointed by Power Plant Decision, CITY OF CARLSBAD (May 31, 2012), 
http://news.carlsbadca.gov/news/city-officials-disappointed-by-234625 (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (describing the Energy Commission’s use of the public convenience and necessity override for a power 
plant to be built in Carlsbad, California); Staff’s Brief on Override Issues, In re Application for Certification for 
the Eastshore Energy Ctr. in Hayward by Tierra Energy of Texas, No. 06-AFC-6 (Cal. Energy Res. 
Conservation and Dev. Comm’n Dec. 7, 2007), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcases/eastshore/ 
documents/lors_override/ENERGY_COMMISSION_STAFFS_BRIEF_ON_OVERRIDE_2007-12-07_TN-
43634.PDF (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (briefing the Energy Commission’s authority to override 
LORS). 
144. Compare E-mail from Dana C. Zentz, supra note 114 (describing the drawbacks of Energy 
Commission siting for smaller projects), with E-mail from Kristen T. Castaños, supra note 135 (“So, in my 
experience, the true process benefits come from the lack of judicial review of CEC [Energy Commission] 
decisions, as opposed to a faster processing timeline.”). Castaños amended her earlier email to clarify that the 
California Supreme Court has granted review, it just “has never reversed a CEC [Energy Commission] siting 
decision.” E-mail form Kristen T. Castaños, Partner, Stoel Rives, LLP, to author (Sept. 5, 2014, 6:24 PM) (on 
file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
145.  PUB. RES. § 25530. Reconsideration may be on the Energy Commission’s own motion or upon 
petition of any party. Id. 
146. Id. § 25531(a), (c). 
147. See, e.g., Santa Teresa Citizens Action Grp v. Cal. Energy Comm’n, 105 Cal. App. 4th 1441 (2003). 
148. PUB. RES. § 25531(b) (“The review shall not be extended further than to determine whether the 
commission has regularly pursued its authority . . . . No new or additional evidence may be introduced upon 
review and the cause shall be heard on the record of the commission as certified by it. The review shall not be 
extended further than to determine whether the commission has regularly pursed its authority . . . . The findings 
and conclusions of the commission on questions of fact are final and are not subject to review . . . .”). 
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providing that the Energy Commission’s “findings and conclusions . . . on 
questions of fact are final and are not subject to review . . . .” 149 
In contrast, one of the biggest uncertainties of current wind siting is whether 
the project will be subject to protracted litigation.150 If a local agency’s CEQA 
approval is challenged, the trial portion can take over a year, and the entire 
process can take up to four years or more with appeals.151 Compare this litigation 
risk with an Energy Commission project that is “essentially ready to go” 
immediately after the Energy Commission’s licensing decision.152 
V. CONCLUSION 
Arguments against a superagency solution for renewable energy sources 
come from both developers and the Energy Commission itself. From a 
developer’s perspective, if there is local support for a project, a standardized 
statewide siting process could create additional hurdles and delays.153 
The problem with the local approach for large-scale wind and PV projects is 
that the locations where developers can easily build may be running out.154 In 
addition, local agency support does not necessarily shield a project from 
litigation by other groups opposing a project.155 Finally, speedy site approval may 
 
149. Id. 
150. John Watts, Reconciling Environmental Protection with the Need for Certainty: Significance 
Thresholds for CEQA, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 213, 216–17 (1995). The Cape Wind project in Massachusetts is also 
a poster child for the problems of litigation opposing a wind project. See Cape Wind, Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management, http://www.boem.gov/Renewable-Energy-Program/Studies/Cape-Wind.aspx (last visited Nov. 
16, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the progress of the Cape Wind Energy Project 
proposed in 2001, which is still being litigated thirteen years later). 
151. E-mail from Kristen T. Castaños, supra note 135. 
152. Id. 
153. Some developers have signaled their desire to avoid Energy Commission review by scaling their 
projects just below the Commission’s 50 MW jurisdictional limit. See, e.g., Salton Sea & Renewable Energy 
Facilities, CAL. STATE SENATE SELECT COMM. ON CAL. ENERGY INDEPENDENCE, http://caei.senate.ca. 
gov/sites/caei.senate.ca.gov/files/company%20bios%2010-1-13.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review) (describing Energy Source’s 49.9 MW facility). “The caveat to all this is, the length of 
time a project’s permitting takes depends a lot on the local agency, their relative experience with similar 
projects, and the complexities of the project. There are solar and wind projects that are so well-sited, in 
jurisdictions with sophisticated staff, with minimal environmental impacts and no opponents, and those can be 
processed by an experienced local agency relatively quickly (6-9 months). For non-controversial projects with 
minimal impacts, a developer would probably benefit from a local siting process.” E-mail from Kristen T. 
Castaños, supra note 135. See also e-mail from Megan Day, Senior Project Planner, Juwi Solar Inc., to author 
(May 8, 2014, 3:24 PM) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (agreeing that there may be a role for a 
statewide agency for larger facilities (wind or solar PV) that may encounter NIMBYism, because they might 
otherwise not get approval at all; but, that if there is local support, then local permitting is, in fact, more 
streamlined and efficient than statewide commissions). 
154. See Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 9, at 1068 (indicating that “local opposition to wind turbines . . . is 
common” and that some areas have gone so far as to enact moratoria on wind turbines). 
155. Cf. supra Part IV.C (describing the comparative litigation-related benefits of the Energy 
Commission’s siting process). 
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not be best if environmental review is sacrificed.156 Because California requires 
CEQA review for all large-scale renewable projects, the time savings are not 
significant, and statewide siting would better ensure consistency of protections.157 
From the Energy Commission’s perspective, a 2011 report on renewable 
development suggests renewable energy sources are distinct: 
California has 482 incorporated cities and 58 counties with about 3,400 
special districts that are “separate local government(s) that delivers [sic] 
a limited number of public services to a geographically limited area.” 
Because each jurisdiction has different population sizes, demographics, 
geography, and renewable resource potential, implementing a one-size-
fits-all energy policy for renewable development is impossible and 
unproductive. . . . Demographic differences such as income and 
education levels, political leanings, and value placed on renewable 
energy also play a role, as do geographic differences that affect the type 
of renewable resource best suited for each jurisdiction. State government 
will need to work closely with local jurisdictions to understand these 
differences and the unique challenges local governments face in pursuing 
renewable energy policies and practices, and provide assistance in 
overcoming those challenges.158 
One explanation for this language could be that the Energy Commission was 
merely commenting on the current decentralized structure of permitting and 
siting of renewable resources, and not attempting to make any recommendations. 
Another explanation is that the Energy Commission meant to be addressing only 
small-scale energy projects,159 treating them consistently with any other 
generation source that does not fall into the 50 MW and greater window 
regulated by the Energy Commission.160  
However, one of the California governor’s “[k]ey [a]ctions to [d]ecarbonize” 
is the goal of “[f]ully integrat[ing] renewable generation sources into the 
electrical grid without [the] building of additional fossil fuel back-up generating 
capacity.”161 Thus, a “more anticipatory approach”162 of viewing energy 
 
156. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014) (subjecting only projects to be carried 
out by a public agency or subject to public agency approval to CEQA). 
157. E-mail from Kristen T. Castaños, supra note 135 (indicating that the local siting process is not 
dramatically faster than the Energy Commission citing process when CEQA compliance is required). 
158. 2011 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT, supra note 57, at 219–20 (emphasis added). 
159. However, this language appears in the section entitled “Cross-Cutting Issue 2: Local Government 
Coordination,” which does not explicitly refer only to smaller renewable projects. Id. 
160. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text (explaining the current siting jurisdiction of the 
Energy Commission). 
161. CALIFORNIA @ 50 MILLION, supra note 53, at 16–17. 
162. Wiseman et al., supra note 22, at 905. 
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development through a more regional energy-shed163 lens, might avoid the 
“consistent and pervasive neglect of cumulative impacts.”164 
The Energy Commission could play a role in achieving the goal of fully 
integrating all energy sources, including renewable resources. The Energy 
Commission could use its authority to make recommendations about how to best 
regulate California’s diverse energy resources, and it could use its integrated 
planning process as a vehicle for evaluating and addressing possible 
improvements.165 
Yet the Energy Commission’s 2013 Integrated Energy Policy Report makes 
no mention of including solar PV or wind siting within the Energy Commission’s 
centralized siting jurisdiction.166 Considering the advantages to placing all large-
scale energy projects, not just thermal projects, under the Energy Commission 
process, why has California not stepped up to its role model status by doing so? 
The Energy Commission’s hesitancy to make this recommendation cannot be 
attributed to a lack of expertise about renewable technologies. The Energy 
Commission is currently responsible for siting concentrating solar thermal 
projects, and the agency now has experience with large scale PV because of 
Senate Bill 226 (SB 226).167 “Several large-scale solar thermal projects already 
permitted at the state level [were] switching to PV technologies due to the 
decreasing cost of PV as compared to solar thermal technologies.”168 SB 226 
granted a short-term expansion of Energy Commission jurisdiction to consider a 
set group of these projects but has not expanded that jurisdiction to include future 
solar PV projects.169 In addition, even though the Energy Commission may not 
 
163. Comparable to the evolution of viewing water regulation through a watershed, as opposed to a 
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction lens. 
164. Outka supra note 15, at 283 (“A reactive regulatory structure [to utility plans] inevitably leads to 
consistent and pervasive neglect of cumulative impacts.”) While the focus of this article has been on large-scale 
renewable energy siting, an argument could be made that even small-scale projects have detrimental cumulative 
impacts. One example is the California ISO “duck curve” model, which suggests problems meeting customer 
demand if too much solar power from southfacing panels are produced. See CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, FAST 
FACTS: WHAT THE DUCK CURVE TELLS US ABOUT MANAGING A GREEN GRID 3 (2013), available at 
http://www.caiso.com/Documents/FlexibleResourcesHelpRenewables_FastFacts.pdf (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). One possible solution to this problem might be to integrate the siting of solar panels 
and orient more to the west “so they capture more late afternoon sunlight, while foregoing greater overall 
generation.” Jeff St. John, Retired CPUC Commissioner Takes Aim at CAISO’s Duck Curve, GREEN TECH GRID 
(Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/retired-cpuc-commissioner-takes-aim-at-caisos-
duck-curve (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
165. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text (describing the Energy Commission’s role in 
collecting data and making recommendations). 
166. 2013 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT, supra note 57. 
167. 2011 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT, supra note 57, at 220 (“Senate Bill 226 . . . allows 
permitted projects larger than 50 MW that switch from solar thermal electric to PV to undergo an Energy 
Commission license amendment rather than a new permitting and environmental review process conducted by 
local government.”); id. at 44 fig.7 (showing large-scale PV and solar thermal projects permitted in 2010). 
168. Id. at 220. 
169. See id. (“Senate Bill 226 . . . allows permitted projects larger than 50 MW that switch from solar 
thermal electric to PV to undergo an Energy Commission license amendment rather than a new permitting and 
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have expertise about wind energy generating technologies, it presumably would 
be in a better position to hire employees with that expertise than would local 
jurisdictions with more limited budgets.170 
The Energy Commission’s hesitancy to recommend centralization of 
renewable energy siting cannot be attributed to lack of knowledge about the 
many difficulties renewable energy developers encounter in this area. In a 2011 
report, the Energy Commission raised a number of concerns about “[f]ragmented 
or overlapping licensing authority,” noting “[w]hen involved agencies cannot 
agree on a set of mitigation or licensing conditions, developers have to satisfy 
more than one set of conditions, submit duplicate information, or face delays 
while agencies attempt to come to agreement.”171 
One explanation for the Energy Commission’s hesitancy might be a concern 
that recommending an expansion of its own jurisdiction would seem 
overreaching. The Energy Commission may also be concerned about treading on 
a generally popular concept—local control. Both of these concerns seem to be 
reflected in the way the Energy Commission supported its recommendation for 
temporarily taking control of the handful of solar PV projects covered by SB 
226: “Without SB 226, the addition of these projects, combined with the 
increased number of PV project applications and the continuing economic 
downturn, could have strained local governments’ ability to process all the 
applications.”172 
 
environmental review process conducted by local government.”). It only covers applicants that petitioned the 
Energy Commission before June 30, 2012 to convert a proposed solar thermal power plant to a PV plant. CAL. 
PUB. RES. CODE § 25500.1(a) (West 2007 & Supp. 2014). Projects on federal land must also have been certified 
by the Department of the Interior or Bureau of Land Management before September 1, 2011. Id. 
170. 2011 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT, supra note 57, at 220 (“Local governments may lack 
the regulatory framework and technical expertise to address the growing number and diversity of renewable 
energy technologies.”). 
171. Id. at 9. Distributed generation (mostly solar PV) faces even more hurdles: 
[T]he wide variation in standards, codes, and fees among local governments make it difficult for 
developers to meet permit requirements. Land-use requirements for identical systems can vary 
significantly form jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Fees also vary widely among municipalities and even 
within municipalities for the same system size, and are often based on project cost rather than staff 
time needed for permit review, with many municipalities exceeding estimated cost recovery fees. 
Developers must also get permit approvals from local fire departments, building and electric code 
officials, and local air districts, leading to duplication and inefficiency in the permit application 
process. Finally, while distributed generation projects are subject an environmental review under the 
California Environmental Quality Act and in some cases the National Environmental Protection Act, 
many local permitting agencies only have thorough environmental screening and review processes in 
place for traditional development and are ill-prepared to assess environmental impacts associated 
with renewable distributed generation. 
Id. 
The 2011 Report disappointingly only notes that it has provided guides to local agencies. Id. at 221 
(explaining that the 2010 Energy Commission Energy Aware Facility Siting and Permitting Guide “provides 
suggestions for permit process streamlining, including one-stop permit centers, pre-application packages and 
conferences, simplified permit language, a single point of contact for all local permits, cross training of staff, 
and the use of program-level EIRs [to satisfy CEQA]”). 
172. Id. at 220 (emphasis added). 
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As the fracking stories referenced in the introduction to this article illustrate, 
there is pushback in many parts of the country against statewide control. Despite 
the concerns over creating a superagency in 1974, the opposition against 
centralization may be even more pronounced in some areas today.173 However, 
recent legislation that has included large-scale wind facilities within the 
jurisdiction of statewide siting agencies means that centralization is plausible, at 
least in some areas.174 
Furthermore, whatever the hesitations, it makes little sense to provide a 
statewide streamlined siting process for conventional thermal power plants, 
which have more detrimental impacts on the environment, while making the 
cleaner renewable energy power plants jump through additional hurdles and costs 
that prevent investment in these technologies. In conclusion, this article urges the 
Energy Commission to explore a superagency solution for all large-scale energy 





173. In fact, much of environmental reform was coming not from local governments but from the federal 
level during this period. 
174. See, e.g., 2011 Cal. Stat. ch. 469. 
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